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 This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction in the Second Judicial District Court, 
pursuant to a jury verdict of second-degree felony murder by means of child abuse, neglect, or 
endangerment.   
Disposition/Outcome  
 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction because 
jurors were not properly instructed on the necessary elements of second-degree felony murder.  
Factual and Procedural History 
 Felicia Ramirez (“Ramirez”) and her boyfriend, Joel Aponte (“Aponte”), were each 
charged with alternative courts of first-degree felony murder by child abuse and second-degree 
murder by means of child neglect or endangerment based on the death of their sixteen day-old 
daughter, Trinity.  Trinity’s death was the result of about twelve blows to the head with a blunt 
object.  Aponte reached a plea agreement byagreeing to plead guilty to child neglect or 
endangerment and testifying against Ramirez.   
During trial, Aponte and Ramirez both testified and offered conflicting stories of the 
night of Trinity’s death.  Aponte testified that Trinity was already in her crib when he returned 
home.  Ramirez testified that Trinity was asleep on the couch when Aponte returned home that 
evening and it was only later that Aponte took Trinity to bed.  Aponte also testified that Ramirez 
was violent, suicidal, and did not want any more children.  Ramirez testified that Aponte was 
physically and emotionally abusive to her and that he had been very uninterested in raising their 
children.  Two other witnesses testified that Aponte was very emotional following Trinity’s 
death, but that Ramirez was not.   
The jury acquitted Ramirez of first-degree felony murder by means of child abuse but 
found her guilty second-degree felony murder by means of child neglect or endangerment.  The 
district court subsequently sentenced Ramirez to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility 
of parole after ten years.  This appeal followed.  
Discussion  
 The Offense of Second-degree Murder 
The Court first recognized the offense of second-degree felony murder in Sheriff v. 
Morris.2
                                                          
1 By Anthony R. Sassi. 
  There, the Court concluded that Nevada’s involuntary manslaughter statute, NRS 
200.070, when read in conjuncture with the murder statute, NRS 200.030(2), permitted second-
2 Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d. 852 (1983).   
degree felony murder.3  The Court was mindful “of the potential for untoward prosecution” and 
limited the rule to cases where there is “an immediate and direct causal relationship between the 
actions of the defendant . . . and the [victim’s] demise.”4  The Court defined immediate to mean 
“without the intervention of some other source or agency.”5  The Court further limited the rule 
by requiring that the felony be inherently dangerous when viewed in the abstract, so that a 
potential felon can foresee the possibility of death or injury.6
The Court reaffirmed its narrow and limited precedent and succinctly stated that the 
second-degree felony murder rule only applies: (1) where the predicate felony is inherently 
dangerous and (2) “where there is an immediate and direct causal relationship . . . between the 
actions of the defendant and the victim’s death.”
   
7
The Jury was not Properly Instructed on the Immediate-and-direct-casual-relationship 
Element 
  Because of the potential for untoward 
prosecutions, these two elements are critical to any second-degree felony murder jury instruction.   
 The district court instructed the jury that the State must prove that: (1) Ramirez did 
“willfully and unlawfully” (2) “permit or allow” Trinity (3) “to suffer unjustifiable physical pain 
as a result of neglect or endangerment,” and (4) Trinity “died as a foreseeable consequence of the 
neglect or endangerment.”  Because of the fourth item, the jury was properly instructed on the 
inherently dangerous prong required of second-degree felony murder.8
The Incomplete Instruction Affected Ramirez’s Substantial Rights   
  However, the jury was 
not instructed that there must have been an immediate and direct causal connection between 
Ramirez’s unlawful act and Trinity’s death.  Therefore, Ramirez was not provided a complete 
and accurate instruction on second-degree felony murder.   
 Reversal is only required if the error is plain from a review of the record and affects a 
defendant’s substantial rights.9  “An error that is plain from a review of the record does not 
require reversal unless the defendant demonstrates that the error affected his or her substantial 
rights by causing actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.”10
   The State Failed to Specify the Predicate Felony to Support a Second-degree Felony 
Murder Conviction 
  While the failure to provide the 
specific elements of second-degree felony murder, standing alone, might not amount to plain 
error, Ramirez’s substantial rights were affected by the improper instruction because (1) the State 
failed to specify the felony and, thus Ramirez could have been convicted under a potentially 
invalid predicate offense; and (2) there was conflicting evidence as to whether Ramirez or 
Aponte inflicted Trinity’s mortal wounds.   
                                                          
3 Id. at 113, 117-18, 659 P.2d at 856, 858-59.   
4 Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859. 
5 Id. at 118-19, 659 P.2d at 859. 
6 Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859. 
7 Labastida v. State, 115 Nev. 298, 307, 986 P.2d 443, 448-49 (1999) (citing Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at 
859). 
8 See e.g., id. 
9 See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.602 (2007); see also 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.255 (2007). 
10 Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477 (internal quotations omitted).   
 Nevada’s felony offense of child neglect and endangerment provides that a person can be 
held criminally liable for both willful and passive neglect.11  Because the law applies to a person 
who does not directly inflict the harm to be guilty of child abuse, in many instances Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 200.508(2) cannot serve as a predicate felony.12
 There was Conflicting Evidence as to Whether Ramirez or Aponte Inflicted Trinity’s 
Mortal Wounds 
  Here the State charged Ramirez with 
second-degree felony murder under Nev. Rev. Stat § 508 without specifying between subsection 
1 and 2.  Accordingly, the jury was not appropriately instructed as to the predicate felony.   
 Given the conflicting evidence on who inflicted Trinity’s mortal wounds, the causal 
element of second-degree felony murder was critically important.  Although there was evidence 
that Ramirez could have caused Trinity’s death, there was also evidence to the contrary.  
Because of the conflicting evidence, the Court could not be certain that the jury determined that 
Ramirez was the immediate and direct cause of Trinity’s death.     
Conclusion 
  As a result of these two errors, the Court concluded that the improper jury instruction 
was prejudicial and affected Ramirez’s substantial rights. Accordingly the district court’s 













                                                          
11 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508 (2007).  
12 Cf. Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 449 (concluding that Labastida’s commission of child neglect could 
not support her second-degree murder conviction because her husband was the person who committed the harm). 
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By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, C.J.: 
            In this appeal, we consider whether the jury was properly instructed on the offense of 
second-degree felony murder by means of child neglect or endangerment.  For the reasons 
outlined in this opinion, we conclude that the jury was not completely and accurately instructed 
as to the necessary elements of second-degree felony murder and that the improper instruction 
affected appellant Felicia Ramirez’s substantial rights.  Accordingly, we reverse the district 
court’s judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.[1] 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
            Appellant Felicia Ramirez and her boyfriend, Joel Aponte, were each charged with 
alternative counts of first-degree felony murder by means of child abuse and second-degree 
felony murder by means of child neglect or endangerment based on the death of their 16-day-old 
daughter, Trinity.  Ramirez and Aponte had two children together, another daughter and newborn 
Trinity. 
            At trial, expert testimony established that Trinity’s death was the result of about 12 blows 
to the head with a blunt object no more than 12 hours before she was declared dead.  She also 
had two small fractures to the back left ribs.  Evidence at trial established that the child had been 
exclusively in the care of Aponte and Ramirez during that 12-hour time frame, and a pediatrician 
testified that Trinity was in good health a few days before her death.  Aponte and Ramirez were 
arrested and charged approximately nine months after Trinity’s death. 
            Shortly before their trial, Aponte reached a plea agreement with the State.  He agreed to 
plead guilty to child neglect or endangerment resulting in substantial bodily injury or death in 
exchange for testifying against Ramirez.  At trial, Aponte testified that when he returned home 
around 5 or 5:30 p.m. on the evening that Trinity died, Trinity was pale and lethargic, but he saw 
no other signs of distress.  Ramirez asked him to check on Trinity several times that night when 
she thought she heard Trinity crying.  When he checked on Trinity around 9 or 9:30 p.m., she 
was not breathing. 
            He also testified to two incidents indicating that Ramirez was violent, suicidal, and did 
not want any more children.  According to Aponte, when Ramirez was pregnant with Trinity, she 
arrived at his house drunk, began yelling that she did not want to live anymore or deal with 
another child, threatened to kill herself and their children, hit herself in the stomach, threw 
herself against a set of concrete stairs, and lay in the street saying she would let the cars run over 
her.  He further testified that on another occasion after Trinity’s birth, Ramirez responded to 
Aponte’s decision to leave her by yelling, throwing things, and saying that she did not want to be 
a mother or to live anymore. 
            Ramirez testified that she was home alone with Trinity from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. on the day 
Trinity died and that Trinity had been fussy, irritated, and a little sick with a cold.  When Aponte 
arrived home at 5 p.m., Trinity was asleep on the couch.  According to Ramirez, she and Aponte 
watched a basketball game while Trinity slept on the couch and then, while Ramirez made 
popcorn, Aponte put Trinity to bed.  Aponte then checked on Trinity a few times after that.  
Ramirez testified that she did not hurt Trinity and did not see Aponte hurt Trinity. 
            Ramirez also explained that she attempted suicide about eight months after Trinity’s 
death because Aponte left her, Trinity was dead, and their other daughter had been taken by child 
services.  Ramirez told the jury that she did not know she was pregnant with a third child at the 
time of the suicide attempt.  She also explained that she was referring to Aponte leaving her, 
Trinity’s death, and her other child being taken away by child services when she said that she 
was “sorry for what [she] did,” that she had “failed as a mother and a girlfriend,” and that “[i]t’s 
all my fault” in her suicide note. 
            Ramirez testified about her relationship with Aponte and his interaction with their 
children.  In particular, she testified that Aponte was physically and emotionally abusive to her 
and that he had not been very interested in raising their two children.  While Aponte would help 
with the children sometimes when asked, he was resistant and would get frustrated quickly, 
calling Trinity names when she cried.  Ramirez testified that Aponte would say, “that bitch cries 
too much” and instruct Ramirez to “shut the bitch up.” 
            Two witnesses testified about Aponte’s and Ramirez’s demeanor on the night of Trinity’s 
death.  The first paramedic responding to Ramirez’s 9-1-1 call testified that Aponte was 
hysterical but that Ramirez did not cry.  Similarly, the coroner’s investigator who picked up 
Trinity’s body at the hospital testified that Aponte was crying but Ramirez was not. 
            The jury acquitted Ramirez of first-degree felony murder by means of child abuse but 
found her guilty of second-degree felony murder by means of child neglect or endangerment.  
The district court subsequently sentenced Ramirez to a term of life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole after ten years.  This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
The jury was not completely and accurately instructed on the offense of second-degree felony 
murder by means of child neglect or endangerment 
            Although she failed to object at trial, Ramirez now contends that the jury was not 
completely and accurately instructed on the necessary elements of second-degree felony murder 
by means of child neglect or endangerment.  We agree that the jury was not properly instructed 
as to all the necessary elements of second-degree felony murder.  And because we conclude that 
the error affected Ramirez’s substantial rights, we reverse the judgment of conviction and 
remand for a new trial despite Ramirez’s failure to object to the instruction below. 
      The offense of second-degree felony murder 
            We first recognized the substantive offense of second-degree felony murder in Sheriff v. 
Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852 (1983).  In Morris, we concluded that Nevada’s involuntary 
manslaughter statute, NRS 200.070, when read in conjunction with Nevada’s murder statute, 
NRS 200.030(2), permitted the offense of second-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.  
See id. at 113, 117-18, 659 P.2d at 856, 858-59. 
            This court, however, was mindful “of the potential for untoward prosecution resulting 
from th[at] decision.”  Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859.  As a result, we specifically limited 
application of the second-degree felony-murder rule to the “narrow confines of this case wherein 
we perceive an immediate and direct causal relationship between the actions of the defendant, if 
proved, and the [victim’s] demise.” Id.  We defined the term “immediate” to mean “without the 
intervention of some other source or agency.”  Id. at 118-19, 659 P.2d at 859.  We further limited 
the application of the rule to felonies that are inherently dangerous when viewed in the abstract.  
Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859.  We recognized that “[t]here can be no deterrent value in a second 
degree felony murder rule unless the felony is inherently dangerous since it is necessary that a 
potential felon foresees the possibility of death or injury resulting from the commission of the 
felony.”  Id. 
            Later, in Labastida v. State, we reaffirmed our narrow and limited holding in Morris, and 
succinctly stated that the second-degree felony-murder rule only applies when the following two 
elements are satisfied:  (1) “where the [predicate] felony is inherently dangerous, where death or 
injury is a directly foreseeable consequence of the illegal act,” and (2) “where there is an 
immediate and direct causal relationship—without the intervention of some other source or 
agency—between the actions of the defendant and the victim’s death.”  115 Nev. 298, 307, 986 
P.2d 443, 448-49 (1999) (citing Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859).  Because we have 
repeatedly expressed disapproval at the potential for untoward prosecutions resulting from our 
decision to recognize the second-degree felony-murder rule and consciously limited application 
of the rule, these two elements are critical to any second-degree felony-murder jury instruction. 
      The jury was not properly instructed on the immediate-and-direct-causal-relationship element 
            The district court instructed the jury that the State must prove the following four elements 
to support a conviction for second-degree felony murder:  (1) Ramirez “did willfully and 
unlawfully” (2) “permit or allow” Trinity (3) “to suffer unjustifiable physical pain as a result of 
neglect or endangerment,” and (4) Trinity “died as a foreseeable consequence of the neglect or 
endangerment.” 
            By instructing the jury that the State must prove that Trinity “died as a foreseeable 
consequence of the neglect or endangerment,” the jury was properly instructed on the inherently 
dangerous element.[2]  See, e.g., Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 448-49.  However, in 
reviewing the instruction, it is clear that the jury was not instructed that there must be an 
immediate and direct causal connection between Ramirez’s unlawful act or acts and Trinity’s 
death.  Therefore, we conclude that Ramirez was not provided a complete and accurate 
instruction on the offense of second-degree felony murder. 
The incomplete instruction affected Ramirez’s substantial rights 
            Even though the jury was not instructed on the necessary elements for the crime of 
second-degree felony murder, because Ramirez did not object to the incomplete and inaccurate 
instruction at trial, reversal is only required if the error is plain from a review of the record and 
affected Ramirez’s substantial rights.  See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 
477 (2008); NRS 178.602; see also NRS 177.255.  “Under th[is] standard, an error that is plain 
from a review of the record does not require reversal unless the defendant demonstrates that the 
error affected his or her substantial rights, by causing actual prejudice or a miscarriage of 
justice.”  Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477 (internal quotations omitted). 
            While the failure to provide the specific elements of second-degree felony murder under 
Morris and Labastida, standing alone, might not amount to plain error, we conclude that 
Ramirez’s substantial rights were affected by the improper instruction because (1) the State 
failed to specify the felony under which it sought a second-degree felony-murder conviction and, 
thus, Ramirez could have been convicted of second-degree felony murder under a potentially 
invalid predicate offense; and (2) there was conflicting evidence as to whether Ramirez or 
Aponte inflicted Trinity’s mortal wounds. 
The State failed to specify the predicate felony to support a second-degree felony-murder 
conviction 
            Nevada’s felony offense of child neglect and endangerment, NRS 200.508, provides that 
a person can be held criminally liable for both willful and passive neglect or endangerment.  
Under NRS 200.508, a person is guilty of neglect or endangerment if he or she either (1) 
“willfully causes a child . . . to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result 
of . . . neglect[[3]] or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental 
suffering as the result of . . . neglect,” or (2) “is responsible for the safety or welfare of a child 
and . . . permits[[4]] or allows[[5]] that child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering 
as a result of . . . neglect or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or 
mental suffering as a result of the . . . neglect.”  NRS 200.508(1) and (2) (emphases added). 
            Whereas NRS 200.508(1) addresses scenarios where the person charged under the statute 
directly committed the harm, NRS 200.508(2), by contrast, addresses situations where a person 
who is responsible for the safety and welfare of a child fails to take action to protect that child 
from the abuse or neglect of another person or source.  NRS 200.508(2) does not require that the 
person directly inflict the harm to be found guilty of child abuse or neglect.  As a result, in many 
instances, NRS 200.508(2) cannot serve as a predicate felony to second-degree felony murder.  
Cf. Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 449 (concluding that Labastida’s commission of 
child neglect under NRS 200.508(2) could not support her second-degree murder conviction 
because her husband was the person who committed the harm). 
            Here, the State charged Ramirez with second-degree felony murder under NRS 200.508 
generally, without distinguishing between subsections 1 and 2.  Further confusing the matter, the 
State charged that Ramirez did “willfully and unlawfully . . . permit or allow [Trinity] to suffer 
unjustifiable physical pain as a result of abuse or neglect,” including the “willful” language from 
NRS 200.508(1), and the passive “permit” or “allow” language from NRS 200.508(2). 
            Because the State’s charging document and the instruction submitted to the jury 
contained language from both NRS 200.508(1) and NRS 200.508(2), the jury was not 
specifically instructed as to the predicate felony under which the State’s theory rested.  This is 
particularly important considering that Ramirez could not be found guilty of second-degree 
felony murder under NRS 200.508(2) in the event that the jury believed that Aponte actually 
killed Trinity.  See Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 448-49 (noting that there must be “an 
immediate and direct causal relationship—without the intervention of some other source or 
agency—between the actions of the defendant and the victim’s death”). 
There was conflicting evidence as to whether Ramirez or Aponte inflicted Trinity’s mortal 
wounds 
            Given the conflicting evidence in this case, which indicated that either Ramirez or 
Aponte could have inflicted Trinity’s mortal wounds, the causal element of second-degree felony 
murder was critically important.  Although there was evidence that Ramirez could have caused 
Trinity’s death (Aponte testified that Ramirez had threatened to kill herself and her children; 
doctors testified that Ramirez did not show any emotion the night Trinity died; Trinity was in 
Ramirez’s exclusive custody and control for the majority of the time frame during which the 
mortal injuries were inflicted; Ramirez did not see Aponte hit Trinity; and Ramirez attempted 
suicide several months after Trinity’s death, leaving a suicide note apologizing “for what [she] 
did”), there was also evidence to the contrary (Aponte cared for Trinity immediately before her 
death; Ramirez testified that Trinity made an unusual cry when Aponte was attending to her; and 
Aponte would get frustrated with the baby and call the baby names).  Because of this conflicting 
evidence, we cannot be certain that the jury determined that Ramirez was the immediate and 
direct cause of Trinity’s death.[6] 
            As a result of these two considerations, we conclude that the improper jury instruction 
was prejudicial and affected Ramirez’s substantial rights.  Accordingly, we reverse the district 
court’s judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.[7] 
  
HARDESTY, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, SAITTA, GIBBONS, and PICKERING, JJ., concur. 
  
**********FOOTNOTES********** 
[1]        In addition to the specific challenges addressed in this opinion, Ramirez contends that 
her conviction should be reversed on the grounds that (1) her Confrontation Clause rights were 
violated; (2) the district court erred by admitting prior bad act evidence; (3) the State failed to 
disclose evidence that was to be used at trial; (4) certain taped telephone conversations should 
not have been admitted based on hearsay grounds; and (5) the jury should have been provided 
instructions regarding malice, accomplice testimony, and the lesser included offense of felony 
child neglect or endangerment causing substantial bodily harm.  Separately, Ramirez argues that 
because she never explicitly waived her right to jury sentencing, her sentence should be vacated 
and remanded. 
            We do not address Ramirez’s remaining challenges because of our decision to reverse her 
conviction on the basis set forth in this opinion. 
[2]        The question of whether a felony is inherently dangerous, where death or injury is a 
directly foreseeable consequence of the illegal act, is a question for the jury to determine under 
the facts and circumstances of each case.  Although our caselaw suggests that we look to whether 
a felony is inherently dangerous in the abstract, see, e.g., Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at 
859; Noonan v. State, 115 Nev. 184, 189, 980 P.2d 637, 640 (1999); Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 
986 P.2d at 448, in practice this question has consistently been analyzed by looking to the 
manner in which the felony was committed.  See Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859 (stating 
that under the facts of the case, the unauthorized sale of a controlled substance was inherently 
dangerous); Noonan, 115 Nev. at 189, 980 P.2d at 640 (concluding that “leaving a sixteen-
month-old child alone in a bathtub for twenty-five to thirty minutes [was] inherently 
dangerous”).  Therefore, in reconciling these conflicting approaches, we abandon any suggestion 
that we should look at the felony in the abstract to determine whether it is inherently dangerous 
in favor of our practice of looking to the manner in which the felony was committed, which 
happens to be the preferred approach. See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 
§14.5(b), at 447-48 (2d ed. 2003); State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 919 (R.I. 1995) (“[T]he better 
approach [rather than viewing the elements of the felony in the abstract] is for the trier of fact to 
consider the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine if such felony was 
inherently dangerous in the manner and the circumstances in which it was committed.”). 
[3]        “[N]eglect” is defined as “physical or mental injury of a nonaccidental nature, sexual 
abuse, sexual exploitation, negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child . . . under 
circumstances which indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened with 
harm.”  NRS 200.508(4)(a). 
[4]        “Permit means permission that a reasonable person would not grant and which amounts 
to a neglect of responsibility attending the care, custody and control of a minor child.”  NRS 
200.508(4)(c) (internal quotations omitted). 
[5]        “Allow means to do nothing to prevent or stop the . . . neglect of a child in circumstances 
where the person knows or has reason to know that the child is . . . neglected.”  NRS 
200.508(4)(b) (internal quotations omitted). 
[6]        The importance of the immediate-and-direct-causal-relationship element is further 
supported by the fact that the jury acquitted Ramirez of first-degree felony murder by means of 
child abuse. 
[7]        While we agree that Ramirez’s conviction should be reversed and remanded for the 
reasons expressed above, we do not agree with Ramirez’s contention that her conviction should 
be reversed for insufficient evidence. 
